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Abstract
We extend the model of Parenti (2018) on large and small firms by introducing
cost heterogeneity among small firms. We propose a novel necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of such a mixed market structure. Furthermore, in con-
trast to Parenti (2018), we show that in the presence of cost heterogeneity among
small firms, trade liberalization may raise or reduce the mass of small firms in op-
eration.
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1 Introduction
Firm heterogeneity is prevalent in international trade. On the one hand, it is evident that
firms are heterogeneous in terms of firm size, with a few dominant large exporters and a
host of negligible small firms.1 On the other hand, small firms also display heterogeneity
in the form of productivity differences.2 This note attempts to address these two types
of firm heterogeneity in a coherent model and examine the impact of trade liberalization.
We draw on the model in Parenti (2018) where large and small firms coexist, but
goes beyond that model by introducing cost heterogeneity among small firms. In our
model, large firms are treated as established incumbent oligopolists, whereas small firms
are treated as monopolistic competitors who endogenously make entry decisions and
face initial uncertainty about their future productivity prior to entry. The heterogeneity
among small firms is in the spirit of Melitz-Ottaviano type’s heterogeneity.3
First, we propose a novel necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such
a mixed market structure in a closed economy, accommodating the cost heterogeneity
among small firms. Large and small firms coexist if (i) the marginal cost of large firms is
strictly lower than that of the least efficient small firm in operation, and (ii) consumers’
preferences on the differentiated goods are sufficiently high, the number of large firms is
not too high, and the cost of large firms is not too low. The former condition guarantees
that large firms earn positive profits, and the latter condition guarantees a positive mass
of small firms in operation.
Second, in contrast to Parenti (2018), we show that bilateral trade liberalization
may raise the mass of small firms selling in each country. Assuming that small firms
share the same cost and do not export, Parenti (2018) finds that trade liberalization
leads to the expansion of large firms and decreases the mass of small firms selling in each
country. However, we introduce cost heterogeneity among small firms and allow the most
efficient ones to export. Therefore, a reduction in trade cost as a result of bilateral trade
liberalization not only reduces the export cost of large firms, but also lowers the trade
cost of small firms. The former effect, which is consistent with Parenti (2018), generates
a negative impact on the mass of small firms, whereas the latter effect generates a
positive impact on the mass of small firms. The impact of trade liberalization on the
mass of small firms selling in each country depends on these two opposing effects. When
the number and cost of large firms are sufficiently high, the former effect dominates,
and trade liberalization decreases the mass of small firms. Otherwise, the latter effect
dominates, and trade liberalization increases the mass of small firms. We also find that
trade liberalization may raise the mass of small producers in each country.
This paper contributes to the recent studies on the mixed market structure with
large and small firms. Assuming that small firms have identical cost, Shimomura and
Thisse (2012) and Pan and Hanazono (2018) identify the condition for the coexistence
of large and small firms and examine the impact of a large firm’s entry in a closed
economy. Complementary to these works, this paper derives a new coexistence condition
incorporating cost heterogeneity among small firms and investigates the impact of trade
1See Parenti (2018).
2See Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
3Representative works include Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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liberalization. Although our results can be regarded as an extension of Parenti (2018),
they open a new channel through which the most efficient small firms could export and
benefit from trade liberalization.
Our results also relate to the research on trade liberalization. In the model with
monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity, Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Otta-
viano (2008) show that bilateral trade liberalization raises the mass of small firms selling
in each country. On the contrary, in our model, bilateral trade liberalization may re-
duce the mass of small firms due to the expansion in the export of large firms. In the
Stackelberg model where large firms are leaders and can export whereas small firms are
followers and sell only in the domestic market, Pan and Tabuchi (2019) also find that
free trade reduces the number of small firms. In contrast, allowing for the export by
efficient small firms, we find that trade liberalization may raise the mass of small firms
because the exporting small firms also benefit from trade liberalization.
2 Closed Economy
Consider an economy with L consumers, each supplying one unit of labor inelastically.
Each consumer consumes two types of goods, a homogeneous good and differentiated
goods. The homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit
cost and perfect competition, which implies a unit wage. The differentiated goods are
supplied by a discrete number N of large firms n = 1, ..., N , and a continuum of small
firms indexed by i ∈ [0,M ]. Occupying a substantial market share, each large firm
behaves strategically as an oligopolist. Being negligible in the market, each small firm
behaves non-strategically as a monopolistic competitor.
2.1 Preferences
All consumers share the same utility function given by
U = α(
∫ M
0
xidi+
N∑
n=1
Xn)−β
2
[
∫ M
0
(xi)
2di+
N∑
n=1
(Xn)
2]− γ
2
(
∫ M
0
xidi+
N∑
n=1
Xn)
2+x0, (1)
where xi represents the individual consumption of the good produced by small firm i,
andXn represents the individual consumption of the good produced by large firm n. The
numeraire good is represented by x0. The demand parameters α > 0 and γ > 0 capture
the degree of substitutability between the varieties of the differentiated product and the
numeraire, and β > 0 represents the degree of differentiation between the differentiated
varieties.
Assuming that consumers have positive demands for the numeraire good, the inverse
demand for small firm i and large firm n are respectively
pi = α− βxi − γX, ∀i ∈ [0,M ] (2)
Pn = α− βXn − γX, n = 1, ..., N (3)
2
whenever xi > 0, Xn > 0, andX=
∫M
0 xidi+
∑N
n=1Xn is the individual total consumption
of the differentiated good.
Inverse demands (2) and (3) can be inverted to the demands for small firm i and
large firm n:
qi = Lxi =
αL
β + γ(M +N)
− L
β
pi +
L
β
γ
β + γ(M +N)
P, ∀i ∈ [0,M ] (4)
Qn = LXn =
αL
β + γ(M +N)
− L
β
Pn +
L
β
γ
β + γ(M +N)
P, n = 1, ..., N (5)
where P =
∫M
0 pidi+
∑N
n=1 Pn is the aggregate price. To ensure a positive consumption,
i.e., qi ≥ 0 and Qn ≥ 0, the prices of large and small firms should satisfy
pi, Pn ≤ 1
β + γ(M +N)
(αβ + γP) = pmax, (6)
where pmax represents the price at which demand for the good is driven to zero.
2.2 Firms
We consider a 2-stage game. In the first stage, small firms enter the market. In the
second stage, large and small firms who have entered the market compete in price.
Small Firms Entry in the differentiated product sector is costly as each firm incurs
product development and production start-up costs. Subsequent production exhibits
constant returns to scale at a marginal cost c. Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
Research and development yield uncertain outcomes for c, and firms learn about this cost
level only after making the irreversible investment fE required for entry. We assume that
the marginal cost of each small firm is a draw from a common and known distribution
G(c) with support [0, cM ]. Since the entry cost is sunk, firms that can cover their marginal
cost survive and produce. All other firms exit the industry.
Substituting the demand function (4), the gross profit of small firm i with marginal
cost ci can be expressed as
pii = (pi − ci)( αL
β + γ(M +N)
− L
β
pi +
L
β
γ
β + γ(M +N)
P), ∀i ∈ [0,M ]. (7)
Large Firms Large firms are established incumbents and produce at marginal cost
C. Substituting the demand function (5), the profit of large firm n can be expressed as
Πn = (Pn − C)( αL
β + γ(M +N)
− L
β
Pn +
L
β
γ
β + γ(M +N)
P), n = 1, ..., N. (8)
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2.3 The Equilibrium Analysis
2.3.1 Stage 2
Small Firms Small firm i maximizes its profit with respect to its price pi, treating the
aggregate price P as given since its market share is negligible. The profit maximizing
price pi and quantity qi then satisfy
qi(ci) =
L
β
[pi(ci)− ci], (9)
If the profit maximizing price pi is above the price bound pmax from (6), then small
firm i exits. Let cD denote the cost of the small firm who is indifferent about remaining
in the industry. This firm earns zero profit as its cost is equal to its marginal cost, that
is, p(cD) = cD = pmax, and its demand level q(cD) is driven to 0. We assume that cM
is high enough to be above cD, so that some firms with cost draws between these two
levels exit. All firms with cost below cD earn positive profits (gross of the entry cost)
and remain in the industry. Substituting (6), and knowing that pmax = cD, the first
order condition of a small firm with c < cD yields its optimal price p(c) and quantity
q(c):
p(c) =
1
2
(cD + c), (10)
q(c) =
L
2β
(cD − c), (11)
and the profit can be expressed by
pi(c) =
L
4β
(cD − c)2. (12)
Large Firms Different from a small firm, who treats the aggregate price P paramet-
rically, a large firm behaves strategically and internalizes its impact on P. Large firm n
maximizes its profit given by (8), yielding the optimal price
Pn = P =
cD + (1−Θ)C
2−Θ , n = 1, ..., N, (13)
where Θ = γ/[β + γ(M + N)] ∈ (0, 1) represents the internalization by the large firm.
Due to the internalization, a large firm’s price depends on the threshold cost cD of small
firms and the mass M of small firms, which are endogenously determined by the free
entry condition in the first stage. Moreover, incurring the same marginal cost C, large
firms set the same price P .
Similar to a small firm, a large firm stops operation if and only if the profit maximizing
price P is above the price bound pmax. Since pmax = cD, the necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of large firms is C < cD.
4
4We assume that large firms incur zero fixed cost. If the fixed cost is positive, then the condition for
the existence of large firms should be stricter.
4
2.3.2 Stage 1
Prior to entry, the expected profit of a small firm is
∫ cD
0 pi(c)dG(c) − fE. Substituting
(12), the free entry condition can be rewritten as
L
4β
∫ cD
0
(cD − c)2dG(c) = fE, (14)
which determines the cost cut-off cD.
To obtain tractable results, we assume the Pareto parametrization for the cost draws
of small firms, i.e.,
G(c) = (
c
cM
)k, c ∈ [0, cM ]. (15)
Given this parametrization, the cut-off cost level cD determined by (14) is then
c∗D = (
βφ
L
)
1
k+2 , (16)
where φ = 2(k + 1)(k + 2)(cM )
kfE is the technology index.
Substituting the optimal prices of small and large firms given by (10) and (13), and
using that pmax = cD, (6) can be expressed as
(α− c∗D)β
γ
=
Mc∗D
2(k + 1)
+N(c∗D − C)
1−Θ(M)
2−Θ(M) , (17)
In equation (17), the LHS is constant and positive, whereas the RHS increases with M .
Let M∗ be the equilibrium mass of small firms. To ensure that M∗ > 0, the RHS should
be smaller than the LHS when M = 0. Therefore, equation (17) uniquely determines a
positive mass M∗ of small firms in operation if and only if
(α− c∗D)β
γ
> N(c∗D − C)
β + γ(N − 1)
2β + γ(2N − 1) .
As shown earlier, large firms earn a positive profit if and only if C < cD. Substituting
the equilibrium cost cut-off of small firms in (16), we establish the condition for the
coexistence of large and small firms in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique mixed market equilibrium where large and small
firms coexist if and only if (i) C < (βφ/L)
1
k+2 and (ii) [α−(βφ/L) 1k+2 ]β > γN [(βφ/L) 1k+2−
C][β + γ(N − 1)]/[2β + γ(2N − 1)].
The first condition, which guarantees that large firms earn positive profits, requires
that the cost of large firms be smaller than the cost cutoff of small firms, which is
satisfied if the technology index φ is sufficiently high and the market size L is not too
large. The second condition, which guarantees a positive mass of small firms, is satisfied
if the consumer’s preference for the differentiated good α is sufficiently high, the cost C
of large firms is not too low in comparison with the cost cutoff (βφ/L)
1
k+2 of small firms,
and the number N of large firms is not too large.
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In models with the coexistence of large and small firms, see, e.g., Shimomura and
Thisse (2012), Parenti (2018), and Pan and Hanazono (2018), it is commonly assumed
that small firms share the same technology. When large firms are single-product and
facing zero fixed cost, their assumption implies large firms operate if and only if C <
c + 2
√
βfE. However, when we allow the small firms to be heterogeneous and facing
cost uncertainty prior to entry, Proposition 1 indicates that large firms should be more
efficient than the least productive small firm to survive.
3 Open Economy
In the previous section, we considered a closed-economy model. In this section, we
extend the model to an open economy, and examine the impact of trade liberalization.
Following Parenti (2018), we consider two symmetric countries, H and F , each with the
same market size and distribution of firms. Specifically, each country has L consumers
who share the same preferences, leading to the inverse demand functions (2) and (3).
In addition, in each country, there are N large firms with marginal cost C, and small
firms share the same cost distribution given by (15). The two markets are segmented,
although firms can produce in one market and sell in the other at a trade cost τ . We
assume that large and small firms exist and export in both countries, and we will identify
the condition in the analysis.
The aggregate price in country h is then defined by
Ph =
∫ Mh
0
pidi+NP
h
D +NP
f
X , h, f = H,F, h 6= f,
where Mh is the mass of small firms selling in country h, including both domestic small
firms and foreign small exporters, P hD represents the price of domestic large firms, and
P fX represents the delivered price of foreign large firms.
The price threshold for positive demand in country h is then given by
phmax =
1
β + γ(Mh + 2N)
(αβ + γPh). (18)
3.1 The Equilibrium Analysis
3.1.1 Stage 2
Small Firms Let phD(c) and q
h
D(c) represent the domestic levels of profit maximizing
price and quantity sold for a small firm producing in country h with cost c. Such a small
firm may also export output qhX(c) at a delivered price p
h
X(c). The delivered cost of a
unit with cost c to the foreign country is τc, where τ > 1 and is the same across all
exporting firms. Since the markets are segmented, small firms independently maximize
the profits in the domestic and foreign markets. Let pihD(c) = [p
h
D(c) − c]qhD(c) and
pihX(c) = [p
h
X(c) − τc]qhX(c) denote the maximized value of these profits as a function of
the firm’s marginal cost c.
6
Analogously to (9), the profit maximizing prices and quantities must satisfy: qhD(c) =
(L/β)[phD(c)− c] and qhX(c) = (L/β)[phX(c)− τc]. As was the case in the closed economy,
only the small firms that earn non-negative profits in a market (domestic or export)
will choose to sell in that market. This leads to similar cost cut-off rules for small firms
selling in either market. Let chD denote the upper bound cost for small firms selling in
their domestic market, and let chX denote the upper bound cost for small exporters from
h to f . These cutoffs must then satisfy:
chD = sup{c : pihD(c) > 0} = phmax, (19)
chX = sup{c : pihX(c) > 0} =
pfmax
τ
.
This implies cfX = c
h
D/τ : trade barriers make it harder for small firms to break even
in the foreign market than in the domestic market.
As was the case in the closed economy, the optimal prices and quantities are also
functions of the cost cutoffs:
phD(c) =
1
2
(chD + c), q
h
D(c) =
L
2β
(chD − c), (20)
phX(c) =
τ
2
(chX + c), q
h
X(c) =
L
2β
τ(chX − c),
which yield the maximized profit levels:
pihD(c) =
L
4β
(chD − c)2, (21)
pihX(c) =
L
4β
τ2(chX − c)2.
Large Firms Similar to the closed economy, we assume that all the large firms share
the same marginal cost C in production, and the delivered cost of a unit to the foreign
country is τC. Let P hD and Q
h
D represent the domestic levels of profit maximizing price
and quantity sold for a large firm producing in country h. The large firm also exports
output QhX at a delivered price P
h
X . Analogously to (13), the profit maximizing domestic
and export prices are
P hD =
chD + (1−Θh)C
2−Θh , (22)
P hX = τ
chX + (1−Θf )C
2−Θf ,
where Θh = γ/[β+γ(Mh+2N)] and Θf = γ/[β+γ(Mf +2N)]. A large firm in country
h stops selling in the domestic market if and only if P hD is above the price bound p
h
max.
Since phmax = c
h
D, the necessary and sufficient condition for the domestic operation of
large firms is C < chD. Furthermore, it stops exporting if and only if P
h
X is above the price
bound pfmax (where f 6= h). Since pfmax = τchX , the necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of exporting large firms is C < chX . These two conditions indicate that
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large firms share the same cost cutoffs with small firms in both domestic and foreign
markets.
Therefore, large firms in both countries export if and only if C < min{cHX , cFX}.
3.1.2 Stage 1
Entry of small firms is unrestricted in both countries. Small firms choose a production
location prior to entry and pay the sunk entry cost. We assume that both countries
share the same technology for small firms – referenced by the entry cost fE and cost
distribution G(c). Therefore, the free entry condition is expressed as
L
4β
∫ ch
D
0
pihD(c)dG(c) +
∫ ch
X
0
pihX(c)dG(c) = fE.
With Pareto parametrization for the cost draws G(c) in both countries, the free entry
condition can be rewritten as
(chD)
k+2 + τ2(chX)
k+2 =
βφ
L
.
Since cfX = c
h
D/τ , the free entry condition (23) can be expressed as
(chD)
k+2 + ρ(cfD)
k+2 =
βφ
L
, (23)
where ρ = (τ)−k ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse measure of trade costs (the “freeness” of trade).
This system can be solved for the cutoffs in both countries:
ch∗D = c
f∗
D = c
∗
D = [
βφ
L(1 + ρ)
]1/(k+2), (24)
by which the average cost of small firms selling in each country is c¯∗D = kc
∗
D/(k + 1).
By (18) and (22), the aggregate price in country h is given by
Ph =
Mh(2k + 1)
2(k + 1)
c∗D +N
c∗D + (1−Θh)C
2−Θh +N
c∗D + (1−Θf )τC
2−Θf ,
Substituting Ph, (18) can be expressed as
(α− c∗D)β
γ
=
Mh
2
c∗D
k + 1
+N(c∗D − C)
1−Θh
2−Θh +N(c
∗
D − τC)
1−Θh
2−Θh . (25)
which uniquely determines the mass of small firms in country h because the RHS strictly
increases with Mh. (25) also implies that Mf = Mh = M and hence Θf = Θh = Θ.
Therefore, (25) could be reduced to
(α− c∗D)β
γ
=
M
2
c∗D
k + 1
+
1−Θ(M)
2−Θ(M)N [(c
∗
D − C) + (c∗D − τC)], (26)
which uniquely determines the equilibrium massM∗ of small firms selling in each country.
To ensure that M∗ > 0, we assume that (α − c∗D)β/γ > N [(c∗D − C) + (c∗D − τC)][β +
γ(N − 1)]/[2β + γ(2N − 1)].
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3.2 Trade Liberalization
Based on the above equilibrium analysis, now we examine how bilateral trade liberaliza-
tion impacts the mass of small firms.
First, (24) indicates that a reduction in trade cost as a result of bilateral trade
liberalization decreases the cost cut-off of small firms, that is, dc∗D/dτ > 0.
Now we examine the impact of trade liberalization on the mass of small firms selling
in each country, including both domestic small producers and foreign small exporters.
By (26), we have
dM
dτ
= −
[αβγ + (1 + τ)NC]
k
k+2
ρ
ρ+1
1
τ − 1−Θ2−ΘNC
c∗
D
2(k+1) + (
Θ
2−Θ)
2[(c∗D − C) + (c∗D − τC)]N
,
which is negative if and only if
2−Θ(M∗)
1−Θ(M∗)
αβ
γ
> (
2ρ+ k + 2
kρ
τ − 1)NC, (27)
where M∗ is the equilibrium mass of small firms determined by (26).
Proposition 2 establishes the impact of bilateral trade liberalization on the mass of
small firms selling in each country.
Proposition 2 A decrease in trade costs as a result of bilateral trade liberalization
increases the mass of small firms selling in each country if (αβ/γ)[2 − Θ(M∗)]/[1 −
Θ(M∗)] > [(2ρ+ k + 2)τ/(kρ)− 1]NC, and decreases the mass of small firms selling in
each country otherwise.
A reduction in trade cost generates two opposing effects on the mass of small firms
selling in each country. First, trade liberalization reduces the export cost and hence
enables more small firms to export, which potentially increases the mass of small firms.
Second, a decrease in trade cost also generates cost savings on the exported goods of large
firms, which induces large firms to expand export. This generates competitive pressure
on small firms and may reduce the mass of surviving small firms. As marginal cost C
rises, the cost savings become stronger and lead to more aggressive exporting behavior
by large firms. Furthermore, the aggregation of such aggressive exports increases with
the number N of large firms. Therefore, condition (27) holds as long as the number N
or marginal cost C of large firms is not too high.
Last, we show that bilateral trade liberalization may also raise the mass of small
producers in each country. By symmetry, in each country, there are MEG(cD) domestic
small producers andMEG(cX) foreign small exporters. Thus,MEG(cD)+MEG(cD/τ) =
M , by which the mass of small entrants in each country can be expressed as ME =
M(cM/cD)
k/(1 + ρ). The mass of small producers in each country is then expressed by
MD =MEG(cD) =
M
1 + ρ
.
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The impact of a reduction in trade cost on the mass of small producers is then given by
dMD
dτ
=
1
1 + ρ
[
dM
dτ
+
kρM
(1 + ρ)τ
].
A reduction in trade cost impacts the massMD of domestic small producers through
(a) the change in the mass M of small firms selling in each country and (b) the realloca-
tion between domestic producers and foreign exporters within the group of small firms.
The change in the mass of small firms selling in each country, according to Proposition
2, is positive as long as thenumber and marginal cost of large firms are not too high.
Furthermore, trade liberalization invites the most productive small firms to increase
export, which makes competition tougher and may force some of the least productive
small producers to exit. This generates a negative impact on the mass of domestic small
producers. Therefore, if the rise in the total mass of small firms selling in each country
outweighs the negative impact from the export expansion by the most productive small
firms, then trade liberalization would also raise the mass of small producers in each coun-
try. Otherwise, trade liberalization reduces the mass of small producers. Proposition 3
establishes this result with the precise condition.
Proposition 3 A decrease in trade costs as a result of bilateral trade liberalization in-
creases the mass of small producers if
αβ/γ + (1 + τ)NC
k + 2
>
M∗c∗D
2(k + 1)
+M∗N [2c∗D−(1+τ )C][
Θ(M∗)
2−Θ(M∗) ]
2+NC
(1 + ρ)τ
ρk
1−Θ(M∗)
2−Θ(M∗) ,
and decreases the mass of small producers otherwise.
Here c∗D andM
∗ are the equilibrium values determined in (24) and (26). Owing to the
expansion of small exporters as a result of trade liberalization, the range of parameters
where trade liberalization increases the mass of small producers narrows down.5
We conclude by highlighting the distinction between our results and those in Parenti
(2018). Take Proposition 2 for instance. Assuming that small firms share the same cost
and do not export, Parenti (2018) finds that trade liberalization decreases the mass of
small firms. In Proposition 2, we go a step further by introducing cost heterogeneity
among small firms and allowing a portion of small firms to export, identifying two
opposing effects of trade liberalization on the mass of small firms. The second effect,
which reduces the mass of small firms, is consistent with Parenti (2018), whereas the
first effect is novel here. The insights of Proposition 2 extend to Proposition 3.
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